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SUMMARY
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When police came to the hospital to interview Carrie, they
indicated that they previously picked up the individual in
question—for sexually assaulting the teenage daughter of a
family friend. The police took Carrie’s rape kit with them when
they left the hospital, and Carrie assumed it was tested. 
After that night in the hospital, Carrie did not hear back from
the police. She called once a day, then once a month. Six
months after her rape Carrie finally received a call back from
the prosecutor who reviewed her case. The prosecutor told her
she was keeping the case open, but “didn’t have any
evidence to move it forward.” Carrie inquired about the results
Carrie was a high school student in 2008 when she was raped in an alleyway by her home
in northern Illinois.1 The man was a family friend of her father’s, but someone she barely
knew. Immediately after the rape, Carrie went to the local hospital to have her body
examined for a rape kit. 
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I learned a lesson when I found out that the police had closed my
case without even interviewing [the rapist], or testing the rape
kit. I learned that you cannot trust that the justice system will
bring hope to you or bring your rapist to jail. You cannot hope
that what went wrong will be righted. 
Justine, Springfield, IL, June 23, 2007
When a victim has a rape kit collected, she is doing everything
that is asked of her in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic
crime. How can we, on the one hand, encourage every rape victim
to get a kit done regardless of whether she knows the suspect or
not, while on the other accept that police discretion means many
of these kits will never get tested? If we are going to go to the
considerable and worthwhile effort to collect rape kits, the least
we can do is test them to see what is there. 
Polly Poskin, executive director, Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault,
December 8, 2009
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of her rape kit, and was informed that it had not been tested
because her case “would not be a strong candidate for
prosecution.” When she asked the prosecutor’s office why,
she was told that “it is too hard to prove that what happened
to you was rape. You may think its rape, but it’s your word
against his.” 
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Rape victims in Illinois have their rape kit administered in hospital
emergency rooms. While some hospitals, like the Chicago area Hospital
pictured here, have Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners [SANEs], many do
not, leaving rape victims to be examined by emergency room doctors and
nurses with no special training for sexual assault victims.  
When a person is sexually assaulted and reports the crime, she will be asked by the hospital staff or the police to consent to
the collection of a rape kit. A rape kit is the DNA evidence gathered from an examination of the victim’s body, a process which
can last between four and six hours. In Illinois, the police collect the rape kit evidence from the hospital, and are responsible
for sending the rape kit to the crime lab for testing at the request of either the police or a state’s attorney’s office
(“prosecutor’s office”). Testing a rape kit can identify the assailant, confirm a suspect’s contact with a victim, corroborate the
victim’s account of the sexual assault, and exonerate innocent defendants.
Julie, 25, was raped by a friend of a friend on June 24, 2007, in Bloomington, Illinois.
She went to watch a movie at a friend’s house. Her attacker waited until he got her alone on the couch. Julie’s rape kit is one of thousands
in Illinois that remain untested and one of hundreds of thousands in police storage facilities throughout the United States.
“I tried pushing him, I tried screaming, ‘No,’ I screamed, ‘Stop,’ I said, ‘You’re hurting me,’ nothing was helping so I ran out of the
apartment and got into my car and was in hysterics and then we ended up going immediately to the hospital.  From there I agreed to do a
rape kit.
Being raped is tragic enough but you go through a rape kit and it’s just as tragic. Having to undress in front of people you don’t know,
having pictures taken, having people pick and prod at your fingernails and taking black lights and going from head to toe looking for
anything they can find.
It literally feels like your body is turned into a crime scene.
I feel like even though my case may have not gone to court regardless if my kit were tested or not, I feel like I would have had somewhat of
a closure, I feel like I would have had answers, maybe not answers that I liked, but I would have answers.
If the rape kit was tested, I feel like I, in some part, would have internal justice. It would have, I wouldn’t be wondering why. It’s hard and
it’s difficult to think that you could potentially be setting someone free to do it to someone else, and the reason not testing a kit.”
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Carrie mentioned that the police had told her they had
arrested the suspect before on suspicion of rape, but the
prosecutor told her that there was not enough evidence in
either case to move them forward. In fact, the prosecutor told
Carrie, “Maybe if we get this guy coming in again for rape, we
can move forward. In acquaintance rapes, it helps to establish
a pattern.” Carrie asked whether the prosecutor’s office would
test her kit to see if it could link her rapist to any other cases,
but the prosecutor declined the suggestion. 
Carrie requested the police file in her case and was provided
with a redacted version which indicated that the police had
not interviewed the suspect, not interviewed other potential
witnesses, nor considered the hospital examiner’s report,
which indicated “vaginal swelling and tearing consistent with
forced penetration.” As far as Carrie knows, her rape kit
continues to sit in police storage, untested.
Carrie is not alone. In Illinois, of the 7,494 rape kits entered
into law enforcement evidence over the past fifteen years by
the 127 agencies that provided Human Rights Watch with rape
kit data, only 1,474, or 19.7 percent, of rape kits booked into
local law enforcement agencies could be confirmed as tested.
This means that only one in five rape kits collected by law
enforcement were definitely tested.2 In Human Rights Watch
interviews, the Illinois State Police indicated that a majority of
sexual assault cases sent to the crime laboratory are
eventually tested, although we were not able to confirm that
using data received from local law enforcement. 
Untested rape kits in Illinois represent lost justice for the
victims who reported their rape to the police; many have lost
faith in the criminal justice system. As one rape survivor told
Human Rights Watch, “When I learned my kit would not be
tested, and my case closed, I thought, why did I even report
my rape? What was the point?”3
This report is the second installment in our national investi-
gation of unprocessed rape kit evidence, and the failure to
investigate and prosecute sexual assault in the US.4 Illinois,
according to the most recent Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) data, makes arrests in only 11 percent of the reported
cases of rape (the national average is 22 percent), and the
rape kit backlog both contributes to and results from this
failure of justice. 
In 2004 after news reports revealed thousands of untested
rape kits in Illinois, then-Governor Rod Blagojevich
announced that the state would attempt to address this
backlog, and helped promote the passage of a law requiring
the testing of all rape kit evidence by the state crime lab.5
In May 2010, during the course of Human Rights Watch’s
research into the continuing rape kit backlog in Illinois, the
state legislature, under the leadership of the Illinois Attorney
General Lisa Madigan, passed a second law—the most
comprehensive rape kit testing reform law in the US—to
become the first state to definitively require that every booked
rape kit be tracked and sent to the crime lab for testing. The
governor is expected to sign the legislation but has not at the
time of this writing. While the bill is a significant step forward
and provides a potential reform model for other states to
follow, the legislation’s success will require a commitment of
resources, oversight, and enforcement from the legislature,
the governor, and other major enforcement bodies. 
The first law, the Sexual Assault Survivors Emergency
Treatment Act of 2004, mandated that rape kits collected by
Illinois state and local police on or after January 1, 2005, and
sent to the Illinois State Police for testing were required to be
tested by the ISP crime laboratory within one year. It also
required the testing of every kit sent to the crime laboratory
before January 1, 2005, within two years of the law’s
enactment.6
The 2004 law’s provisions were vague and confusing as to
whether they required every rape kit collected by law
enforcement be sent to the crime lab for testing. Human
Rights Watch found only six law enforcement agencies that
thought they were obligated under the 2004 law to send every
kit to the crime lab. As a result, the law seems to have had a
limited effect on rape kit testing policies of police
departments in Illinois. It is also not clear whether the law
helped the ISP reduce the rape kit backlog in their crime
laboratory, possibly because of a significant loophole in the
2004 law, that testing of every kit within the timeframes
specified would only occur “if sufficient staffing and resources
are available.” While the Illinois State Police may have
needed more funds to eliminate the rape kit backlog, the
auditor general, in a report issued in 2009, found that the ISP
misused some of the state funds they were given to test rape
kits and other DNA evidence. 
Capacity constraints and limited resources may explain the
number of untested rape kits at the crime laboratory, but
cannot explain the large numbers of untested or unaccounted-
for rape kits in police custody. Most individual police
department policies that Human Rights Watch reviewed allow
detective or department discretion in deciding which rape kits
to send to the crime lab. Kit processing may be stymied on the
level of investigating officers, who exercise their discretion
not to send the kits to laboratories for any number of reasons;
for example, if they presume that in cases of acquaintance
rape the collected evidence is unnecessary, or that, even
without interviewing a suspect, the case is too weak to move
forward. 
Some jurisdictions in Illinois empower their local prosecutors
(state’s attorneys) to conduct what is known as a “felony
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review” of each potential criminal case in order to approve
charges (other jurisdictions conduct similar reviews but may
not officially refer to it as “felony review”). The state does not
collect information on the ultimate disposition of each case of
sexual assault. But while Illinois courts have ruled that felony
sexual assault prosecutions may proceed where there is
“credible victim testimony,” state’s attorneys reject many of
these cases even in the presence of such testimony. This
failure to lodge charges then indicates to police that
processing collected rape kits would be futile. State’s
attorneys also seem to stop the processing of kits by
intervening directly with state crime labs, according to
testimony collected by Human Rights Watch. Overall, the
failure to process rape kits reflects an inadequate law
enforcement response to the crime of sexual assault, one
which violates the human rights of victims. 
In response to the continuing backlog of cases since the 2004
law and news of significant numbers of untested rape kits in
police storage facilities, and to address inadequacies of
clarity and enforcement in the prior legislation, in May 2010
the Illinois legislature passed the Sexual Assault Evidence
Submission Act, a landmark rape kit reform which was
championed by Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan. The bill
significantly expands upon the 2004 law—it mandates that
every rape kit be sent to the crime lab within 10 days of its
entrance into local law enforcement evidence and be tested
within six months of its receipt by the crime lab; adds rape kit
data reporting requirements; and requires the Illinois State
Police to produce a plan to test every new rape kit it receives
and to eliminate the current backlog. The law does contain the
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One of the Illinois State Police Labs in Springfield that will test Illinois’s
rape kits. While the Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act of 2010 is a
significant step forward and provides a potential reform model for other
states to follow, the legislation’s success will require a commitment of
resources, oversight, and enforcement from the legislature, the governor,
and other major enforcement bodies. 
same testing requirement loophole that may have contributed
to the mixed results of the 2004 Sexual Assault Survivors
Emergency Treatment in reducing the crime lab backlog: the
timeframe for crime lab analysis is contingent upon the
availability of “sufficient staffing and resources.” The Illinois
State Legislature has not yet appropriated any funds for the
police and crime labs to implement this law. 
According to the law’s provisions, the legislature may
authorize funding for the law once the Illinois State Police
submits a plan for analysis which will include resource needs.
This plan is due to the legislature no later than February 15,
2011. Given that police departments across the state currently
do not submit to the crime lab all of the rape kits they enter
into evidence, successful implementation of the law will
require, among other things, an increased fiscal commitment
from the legislature to make this good law a practical reality.
If the necessary resources are not made available to law
enforcement and the crime laboratories to test every rape kit,
Illinois must adopt a uniform decision-making process to
determine which rape kits are tested. Objective criteria that
are relevant to the probative value of the evidence to the case
must guide this process. 
During the course of our research into the rape kit backlog in
Illinois, we encountered numerous obstacles which made it
difficult to get an accurate account of the status of rape kits
collected in the state, obstacles that also affect treatment of
sexual assault in the state’s criminal justice system. There is a
distinct lack of uniformity among jurisdictions in how rape kits
are tracked by police and sheriff’s departments once booked
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The Illinois State Police will store Illinois’s rape kits in storage facilities
like this vault in Springfield, IL. In May 2010 the Illinois General
Assembly, with the leadership of the Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan, passed the Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act of 2010 to
make Illinois the first state to definitively require that every booked rape
kit be tracked and sent to the crime lab for testing.
During a rape kit exam, a nurse or doctor conducts the medical
and forensic examination. The following are steps that should be
followed according to best practices for the administration of a
rape kit:
•   The victim undresses while standing over a large sheet of
paper, and anything that falls from the clothing or body that may
provide links to a perpetrator or a crime scene—for example,
hairs, debris, and carpet or clothing fibers—is collected and
placed in the rape kit. 
•   A nurse or doctor examines the victim on a gynecological table
with stirrups. 
•   The nurse or doctor scans the body with an ultraviolet light to
find what may be otherwise undetectable semen or saliva that
might contain the assailant’s DNA. 
•   The nurse or doctor then swabs every part of the victim’s body
that the ultraviolet light fluoresces. 
•   The victim is examined from “head to toe” to identify any
physical injuries sustained during the assault, which can include
scratches, bruises, bite marks, ligature marks, and burst blood
vessels caused by strangulation. 
•   Every visible physical injury is photographed. 
•   A magnifying digital camera called a colposcope—which is
noninvasive and can photograph inside body cavities without
requiring insertion—is placed near the anal, vaginal, and oral
cavities to record any lacerations or other injuries inside those
areas. 
•   The nurse or doctor then collects other samples, such as
fingernail scrapings, pubic hair combings, and urine and blood,
placing each in separate envelopes or tubes. The swabs are
labeled and sealed in containers with evidence tape. All of the
evidence is then placed in a large white envelope—the rape kit.
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into their evidence storage facilities. While the new 2010 law
addresses some of these issues, at the time of our research,
there were no state guidelines regarding how jurisdictions
should track rape kits, record the status of rape kits, or format
chain of custody and incident reports. Until Human Rights
Watch requested the rape kit data from jurisdictions, many
had never counted their untested rape kits or set up a system
to track such kits. 
Furthermore, some of the largest jurisdictions in Illinois did
not respond to our data requests by the time this report went
to press. Chicago, the state’s largest urban area by far with
over 2.7 million people and at least 21 percent of the state’s
population, provided limited data to Human Rights Watch;
they agreed to audit the rape kits collected over the past two
years but did not respond to our request for more compre-
hensive data. And although the Illinois Office of the Attorney
General public records response training program given to
over 500 law enforcement officers and 12,000 public agencies
in the state, jurisdictions failed to respond appropriately to
our public records requests. 
There were also egregious instances of agencies providing, or
failing to properly redact, sensitive identifying information in
their public records responses. More than 25 agencies
supplied victims’ names and 22 agencies also gave suspects’
names. In total, more than 1,000 victims’ names—nearly 100
of them child victims—were handed over to Human Rights
Watch from public records requests. Victim and suspect
addresses, telephone numbers, and social security numbers
were also given by a number of law enforcement agencies.
Several agencies submitted the private information of
juvenile victims. DNA test results were also mailed to Human
Rights Watch in response to the public records request, which
did not—and could not legally—have sought such
information. These errors in public record data management
occurred despite the fact that the Illinois Office of the Attorney
General offers comprehensive data training to law
enforcement offices in Illinois. It is troubling that, despite
receiving adequate public records training, law enforcement
departments continue to make these serious mistakes. 
Despite these obstacles, we have been able to capture a
significant portion of the number of untested rape kits in
Illinois. In total, from rape kit information provided by 127 law
enforcement agencies to Human Rights Watch, at least 7,458
rape kits were entered into law enforcement storage in Illinois
in the past 10 years, of 16,738 rapes reported in recent years.
Only 31 percent of reported rapes resulted in the adminis-
tration of a rape kit. Law enforcement agencies reported that
3,547 (47.6 percent) of these kits were sent to crime labs, and
knew that only 1,474 (19.7 percent) of the kits were tested
although the Illinois State Police told Human Rights Watch a
majority of rape cases sent to them are eventually tested.
Police and sheriff’s departments also reported that a total of
4,173 kits were presently stored in local facilities, 38 rape kits
were stored with the Illinois State Police, and 1,890 kits were
known to be destroyed.
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Figure 1—Status of Rape Kits Entered into Evidence by Police and Sheriff’s Departments in Illinois 
Source: Data received in response to Human Rights Watch public records requests. 
Note: One hundred twenty-seven police and sheriff’s departments provided sufficient data for analysis on both reported rapes and rape kits (N=7,458). 
In addition to untested rape
kits in police storage
facilities, Human Rights
Watch also found other
failures reflective of the
inadequate law enforcement
response to reported sexual
assaults: a shortage of
sexual assault nurse
examiners (SANEs) to
perform rape kit collections;
insufficient hospital
treatment facilities for rape
victims; and testing delays at
the state crime laboratory. 
This report focuses primarily
on the number of untested
rape kits Human Rights
Watch found in police storage
facilities, using data from
Human Rights Watch public
records requests. It also
points to larger concerns with
the state crime lab’s current
capacity to handle the influx
of untested rape kits it will
receive from police
departments when the 2010
Sexual Assault Evidence
Submission Act goes into
effect, assuming it is signed
by the governor. The 2010 law
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Figure 2—Portion of Total Rapes Reported to Police Departments in Illinois 
Resulting in Tested Rape Kits
Source: Data received in response to Human Rights Watch public records requests. 
Note: Eighty-four police departments provided sufficient data for analysis on both reported rapes and rape kits. 
Figure 3—Location of Collected and Confirmed Untested Rape Kits in Illinois
Source: Data received in response to Human Rights Watch public records requests.
Note: One hundred twenty-seven police and sheriff’s departments provided sufficient data for analysis on both reported rapes and rape kits (N=7,458). 
will require the Illinois State Police to come up with a plan to
test this influx of rape kits, and we urge the legislature, when
presented with the plan, to appropriate the necessary funds
required to implement the ISP plan. 
If Illinois public officials wish to implement good public safety
policy standards and conform to human rights law they
should move decisively to comply with the 2010 law and
eliminate untested rape kits in Illinois, and more vigorously
investigate and prosecute reported cases of rape. Rape
victims deserve justice and the people of Illinois expect law
enforcement to do all they can to prevent future crime.
International human rights law requires police to investigate
reports of sexual violence and take steps to protect
individuals from sexual assault. The United States is party to
a number of treaties that acknowledge rape as a human rights
abuse and require the US to ensure the protection of its
citizens from sexual assault and rape. These treaties also
entitle victims of violations to an effective remedy, placing
obligations on the US to ensure there is effective access to
justice when such crimes are committed.
For example, the United States is party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention against
Torture”), both of which set out important standards for
victims of rape.7 The ICCPR guarantees the right to security of
the person under Article 9, which includes a right to
protection of bodily integrity against third parties.8 Both the
Convention against Torture and the ICCPR (under Article 7)
guarantee the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment.9 International tribunals and other
bodies have established that rape is covered by these
prohibitions on torture.10
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) has made
it clear to states party to the ICCPR that they must “take
appropriate measures or … exercise due diligence to prevent,
punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts
by private persons or entities.”11 The Committee against
Torture requires states party to prevent and protect victims
from gender-based violence and rape by exercising due
diligence in investigating, prosecuting, and punishing
perpetrators—even private actors—of rape and sexual
assault.12
Specifically, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) obligates states party
to combat discrimination against women.13 The Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the treaty
body that interprets and monitors compliance with CEDAW,
has affirmed that violence against women is a form of discrim-
ination against women, and that states party to it should have
effective legal, preventive, and protective measures in place
to provide justice for victims, hold offenders accountable, and
protect society from future acts of sexual violence.14 While the
US has not ratified CEDAW and is therefore not a full party to
the treaty, it did sign the treaty in 1980 and therefore still
bears a number of legal obligations including, at a minimum,
not to act in a way that would undermine the intent and
purpose of the treaty.15
The Inter-American system, of which the US is a member, pays
special attention to violence committed against women and
children.16 The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (“the
Convention”) prohibits violence against women and affirms a
woman’s right to physical integrity and security. It further
requires state parties to act with “due diligence to prevent,
investigate and impose penalties for violence against
women.”17 Since rape is a crime that is primarily committed
against women, states party to the Convention have a special
obligation to respond to and prevent rape and sexual assault.
The United States is one of three members of the Organization
of American States that has not ratified the Convention.18
Bearing in mind these standards, governments should take
the necessary measures to avoid the significant
consequences of delayed or denied justice for victims of rape.
Illinois is grappling with those consequences, and the 2010
Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act provides unprece-
dented potential for rape reform. Given the large number of
untested kits in Illinois local law enforcement storage and the
significant resources necessary to complete the task,
resolving the way Illinois deals with its untested rape kits and
ensuring the success of the 2010 law will require the
continued leadership of many of Illinois’s elected officials. In
order for laws like the Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act
to have concrete results for rape victims, Illinois will need to
demonstrate greater commitment, in both oversight and
resources, to enforcing its laws on rape kits. The value a state
places on its rape kits is one measure of how seriously it takes
the crime of rape and the victims who report sexual violence.
Testing rape kits has a practical effect on criminal justice
outcomes, but it also sends an important message to rape
victims—that their cases matter. 
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http://www.oas.org/cim/english/convention%20violence%20against%20wo
men.htm (accessed June 23, 2010), art. 7 (b).
18 Canada, Cuba, and the United States have not ratified the Convention.
However, from 1962 until June 3, 2009, Cuba was suspended from partici-
pating in the Inter-American system, a suspension that was lifted by OAS
Resolution AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09),
http://www.oas.org/dil/general_assembly_resolutions_39_regular_session_
honduras_june_2009.htm (accessed June 23, 2010). 
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This report relies on data collected by Human Rights Watch
over the course of an ongoing, 10-month investigation into
rape kits in Illinois. During the course of our research, Human
Rights Watch conducted 304 telephone or in-person
interviews with police officers, chiefs of police and police
executives, crime lab personnel, crime lab directors and
officials, sexual assault forensic nurses, rape treatment
providers, elected city officials, victims of rape, family
members of rape victims, rape victim advocates, state and city
sexual assault organization directors and senior staff,
national sexual assault and victim’s rights organizations’
directors and senior staff, senior staff at the US Department of
Justice Office of Justice Programs, civil attorneys, public
defenders, county attorneys, state legislators, officials at the
Illinois Office of the Attorney General, local newspaper
reporters who have covered the issue of rape kit backlogs
extensively, and statisticians from state and city criminal
justice statistics offices. 
We conducted on-site visits to the Illinois State Police crime
labs and evidence storage facilities in Springfield and
Chicago. 
We submitted more than 260 requests under the Illinois
Public Records Act to every county and the most populous
cities in the state, as well as to the Illinois State Police crime
laboratory system. We requested rape reporting, arrest,
prosecution, conviction, and dismissal rates, and documents
pertaining to the collection, processing, and backlog of rape
kits. The records requests were mailed out of Human Rights
Watch’s Washington, DC, office on or around June 9, 2009,
and analysis began in late April. Any information received
after we began data analysis was not included in the report.
DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Data arrived from city and county law enforcement agencies in
a variety of formats. While some departments provided data
in aggregate form, others submitted electronic and paper files
of individual cases. When individual case files were
submitted, Human Rights Watch staff compiled and
aggregated statistics. Data was then entered into a database
and subsequently cleaned for errors. All data analysis was
completed using statistical software (SPSS v.17). 
In addition to the data obtained through our public records
requests, Human Rights Watch obtained data on reported
rape and rape arrests from the Illinois Uniform Crime
Reports.19
Population and demographic data for selected cities and
counties was obtained from the American Community Survey
3-year estimates (2006-2008).20 Data analysis mainly
consisted of descriptive statistics including frequencies,
rates, and cross-tabulations. 
While Human Rights Watch’s public records requests asked
for data corresponding with the years 1995 through 2009,
agencies provided data for an assortment of years. 
Some agencies provided reported rape and arrest data for one
set of years, and rape kit testing data for a different set of
years. When this occurred, analysis of the rape kit data only
included reported rapes and arrests from the corresponding
years. 
There were three cities (Du Quoin, Charleston, and Centralia)
where the years for rape kit data and the corresponding years
for reported rapes and arrests could not be isolated because
reported rape and rape arrest data was aggregated, making it
impossible to extract data from specific years. In these cases,
estimates for year-specific reported rapes and arrests were
generated assuming a linear trend in rapes and arrests.
I. METHODOLOGY
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Human Rights Watch requested information from 264 law
enforcement agencies and received no response from 80
departments (30.3 percent). An additional 36 (13.6 percent)
agencies that did respond to the initial request refused or
failed to provide us with the requested data. Seventy (27.2
percent) agencies provided Human Rights Watch with all of
the data requested while 78 (29.5 percent) provided at least
partial answers to our requests.21 Of those agencies that
provided Human Rights Watch with full or partial data, 104
were city police departments and 44 were county-level
agencies.
Data requests were sent to 162 cities. Human Rights Watch
received no data from 58 city police departments, partial data
from 55 departments, and complete data from 49 cities. Of the
20 largest cities in Illinois, Human Rights Watch received
partial or complete data from 15 police departments. Human
Rights Watch also requested data from 102 county sheriff’s
departments. Twenty-one counties provided complete data,
23 provided partial data, and 58 counties did not provide
data.
The majority of the data sent by agencies failed to fully comply
with the public records request. Only 33 percent of the
agencies responded with data that was complete or did not
include errors. The most common errors concerned the lack of
information (either not answering a question, or responding
that they did not know the answer to a question) on the status
of rape kits including whether or not they were tested and
where they were being stored.
Of the 148 agencies that responded with data to our public
records request, 85 percent provided information on rape kits.
However, data provided on rape kits, including the end-
results of rape kits, was often incomplete, uncertain, or
unknown. While most departments that responded could
provide a total number of rape kits collected, many could not
determine the destinations or final results of the kit. In many
cases, departments required Human Rights Watch to comb
through boxes of evidence they provided in response to our
request in order to investigate final destinations of rape kits.
Given these failings, the total statistics aggregated here
cannot be assumed to tell the entire story of DNA rape kit
processing in Illinois. Nevertheless, the data in this report are
the best possible estimates of the administering, collection,
processing, and storage of rape kits in Illinois given the data
presented by law enforcement agencies.
METHODOLOGY
19 Illinois State Police, “2008/2007 Crime Index Offense and Arrest
Database,” http://www.isp.state.il.us/crime/cii2008.cfm (accessed May 13,
2010). 
20 US Census Bureau, “2006-2008 American Community Survey 3-Year
Estimates,”
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=AC
S&_submenuId=datasets_2&_lang=en&_ts= (accessed June 16, 2010).
21 Numbers do not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
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TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 
• Pass legislation requiring law enforcement to notify sexual assault victims of the testing status of their
rape kit within three months of its collection and periodically thereafter until the testing is completed; 
• After the Illinois State Police present their rape kit backlog reduction plan as required by the 2010 Sexual
Assault Evidence Submission Act , approve increased funding to the Illinois State Police necessary for the
testing of all booked rape kits;
o If this increased funding is not approved, establish uniform, objective statutory criteria for how rape
kit testing should proceed in Illinois. This criteria should require that felony sexual assault cases
cannot be rejected or closed until a rape kit in the case has been tested; 
• Create a permanent rape kit task force to exercise oversight of the implementation of the 2010 Sexual
Assault Evidence Submission Act; and 
• Approve legislation to increase funding for the sexual assault nurse examiner program, and provide
incentives for hospitals to employ full-time sexual assault nurse examiners.
TO THE ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
• Continue efforts to operate the Rape Kit Task Force to address rape kit testing in Illinois: 
o Include rotating, formal representatives from various stakeholders in the criminal justice system,
including sexual assault nurse examiners, crime lab personnel, state’s attorney’s offices, police and
sheriff officials, and sexual assault providers;
o Hold monthly meetings, open to the public; and 
• Continue public records training for law enforcement to ensure private information of crime victims or
suspects is not released to third parties as part of a public records request.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
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RECOMMENDATIONS
TO ALL LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DEPARTMENTS IN ILLINOIS: 
• Create a formal system to track all rape kits collected and to determine the status of a rape kit at any
stage in the storage or testing process; 
• Create a law enforcement unit tasked with investigating cold hit leads from the rape kit backlog; 
• Create a permanent sexual assault unit to handle all sex crimes investigations, whose officers receive
training in victim sensitive interviewing and interrogation of the suspect; 
• Implement a system to inform sexual violence victims of the status of their rape kit test: 
o Identify an officer with specialized expertise in conveying sensitive information to sexual assault
victims;
o Create a policy to require law enforcement to notify victims of their rape kit’s testing status within
three months of its collection; and
• Require local law enforcement officers to participate in attorney general training on public records request
responses. 
TO THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE CRIME LABS:
• Create monthly public reports on the number of rape kits tested each month, including the time it took for
the testing’s completion;
• Establish a system for simultaneous, electronic notification of the crime lab, law enforcement, and
prosecutors when a DNA profile matches a profile in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) (a “cold
hit”); 
• Address crime lab capacity concerns by securing the funding and space for the DNA analysts required to
test every booked rape kit in a timely manner;
• Report to the governor, General Assembly, and attorney general on implementation of the 2010 Sexual
Assault Evidence Submission Act; and
• Prioritize funds from the federal DNA Casework and Backlog Reduction Grant Program for the testing of
rape kits.
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TO ALL STATE’S ATTORNEY’S OFFICES:
• Create uniform, state-wide guidelines for how sexual assault cases are reviewed (such as the felony review
process or similar review processes) which would, among other things: 
o Require that a case not be rejected until a standard number of investigative procedures have
occurred, including testing a rape kit where one is available, interviewing all witnesses in the case,
and interviewing both the victim and the suspect; 
o Ensure that “acquaintance rapes” are subject to the same standards of proof as “stranger rapes”; 
o Require sexual assault victim-centered training for all state’s attorneys who may interact with victims
of sexual violence;
• Implement a “cold hit” tracking program, which would track the outcomes of rape kit testing on rape
investigations, arrests, charges, prosecutions, dismissals, convictions, and exonerations;
• Create a special unit tasked with pursuing prosecutions from investigative leads generated from the
testing of the rape kit backlog; and 
• Oversee law enforcement implementation of victim notification policies. 
TO THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY: 
• Create data and technical support systems to assist local and state law enforcement with tracking rape kit
evidence, including location, testing status, and investigative outcomes;
• Create a uniform data tracking form which all law enforcement must use to track their rape kit evidence;
and
• Create a sexual assault case registry, which would track the process of sexual assault cases from report to
final disposition.
TO ALL HOSPITALS IN ILLINOIS:
• Work with other hospitals in densely populated regions to ensure at least one hospital has a specialized
treatment center for rape victims;
• Provide administrative and funding support for nurses who wish to receive Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
Training; and 
• Allow certified SANE nurses who are not emergency room nurses to practice within the hospital’s
emergency room, as is standard with national best practices. 
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III. Keeping Track of Sexual Violence in Illinois 
 
One way to measure what the government cares about is what they choose to 
collect data on. One of the great hurdles of my work on sexual violence is the 
lack of comprehensive data available for us concerning criminal justice 
outcomes for felony sexual assault. 
—Kaethe Morris Hoffer, legal director, Justice Project Against Sexual Harm of 
the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation21 
 
Rape is a crime with serious consequences, and it demands serious attention. The traumatic 
impact of sexual violence is widely accepted by experts, as documented by years of 
academic and government studies.22 As far as Human Rights Watch can tell, no agency in 
Illinois tracks the status, progress, and outcome of rape cases from the moment the rape is 
reported until the resolution of the case—making it very hard to get accurate data on the true 
rate of reported rapes that lead to an investigation, arrest, or other criminal justice outcome. 
In fact, numerous experts on sexual violence that Human Rights Watch spoke with identified 
the lack of comprehensive case-tracking systems, including the tracking of forensic evidence 
like rape kits, as a key barrier to understanding what is happening with rape cases in the 
Illinois criminal justice system and what effect rape kit collection and testing has on case 
outcomes.  
 
Incidences of Sexual Violence  
At least 4,118 individuals reported being raped in Illinois in 2008, the last year for which 
Human Rights Watch has data for the entire state—an average of more than 11 rape reports 
made to the police every day.23 These reported rape cases include sexual crimes committed 
against both adults and children. Illinois, like much of the United States, is currently 
experiencing a historic low in reported rapes, although it is important to note that rape is 
traditionally an underreported crime. Comprehensive academic studies estimate that 
reported rapes represent 10 to 20 percent of all rapes, and that one in every six women in 
                                                          
21 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Kaethe Morris Hoffer, legal director, Justice Project Against Sexual Harm of 
the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation, Chicago, IL, October 2, 2009. 
22 See for example, John Briere and Marsha Runtz, “Post Sexual Abuse Trauma,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, vol. 2, no. 4, 
1987, pp. 367-379; Dean G. Kilpatrick, “The Mental Health Impact of Rape,” National Violence Against Women Prevention 
Research Center, http://www.musc.edu/vawprevention/research/mentalimpact.shtml (accessed March 10, 2010).  
23 The reporting data include both adults and juveniles. Reporting and arrest data were obtained through public records 
requests to the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, which is the state’s crime data tracking center, and from the FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports, 1999-2008, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (accessed November 13, 2009).  
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the US will be the victim of a rape or an attempted rape in her lifetime.24 Polly Poskin, 
executive director of the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault, an association of 
community-based rape crisis center, said, “We know that most rapes go unreported. It is a 
very hard crime to report, especially given how many cases languish before being closed 
without an arrest or charges.”25  
 
While reported rapes have decreased in Illinois in the past decade arrest rates—the number 
of reported rapes leading to an arrest—have also declined. In 1999 the arrest rate for rape in 
Illinois was 17 percent, meaning a rape victim who reported her rape had about a one in six 
chance of seeing an arrest in her case. In 2008 the arrest rate for rape in Illinois had 
declined to 11 percent, meaning a rape victim who reports her rape has about a one in nine 
chance of seeing an arrest in her case. Illinois’s 2008 arrest rate of 11 percent was well 
below the national average calculated by the FBI of 22 percent.26 
 
While the declining arrest rate for sexual violence in Illinois may involve many factors, 
studies have shown that testing rape kits has an effect on the arrest rate for rape. For 
example, when New York City eliminated its rape kit backlog and implemented a policy of 
testing every future booked rape kit, the city’s arrest rate for rape skyrocketed from 40 
percent to 70 percent.27 
 
Illinois’s data management failure is symptomatic of its poor response to rape. We 
compared Illinois data provided to us for exactly the same years and jurisdictions with that 
contained in the state’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Only four cities provided the same 
number of reported rapes in data sent to us and to the UCR. Data a jurisdiction provided to 
Human Rights Watch and the data provided to the UCR differed by as much as 275 percent. 
This comparison provides evidence of inconsistencies in the reporting of rape statistics and 
the need for data management systems—and protocols for reporting rape statistics—to be 
standardized throughout the state’s police and sheriff’s departments. We believe that the 
                                                          
24 See for example, Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes, 
“Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Rape Victimization: Findings From the National Violence Against Women Survey,” 
National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, January 2006, 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf (accessed February 23, 2009). 
25 Human Rights Watch interview with Polly Poskin, executive director, Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Springfield, IL, 
May 12, 2009.  
26 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), US Department of Justice, “Crime in the United States 2008,” September 2009, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/index.html (accessed June 23, 2010).  
27 Human Rights Watch interview with Marie Samples, assistant director, New York Office of the Medical Examiner DNA Unit, 
New York, NY, March 14, 2008; and Human Rights Watch interview with Lisa Friel, assistant district attorney, Special Victims’ 
Unit, Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, and Martha Bashford, assistant district attorney, Cold Case Sex Crimes Unit, 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, New York, NY, March 18, 2008. 
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poor data management is indicative of a broader failure to respond to rape in the state of 
Illinois. 
 
Police alone are not to blame for the poor criminal justice response to rape. In various 
jurisdictions in Illinois,28 prosecutors (referred to as state’s attorneys) are involved early in 
an investigation through a process that some jurisdictions refer to as “felony review” (other 
jurisdictions have similar programs, but do not refer to them as “felony review”). With each 
practicing jurisdiction creating its own felony review (or felony review-like) procedures, 
police can charge a person with a felony only after they obtain pre-approval of the charges 
from a state’s attorney. For this reason, police will often wait to proceed with a rape 
investigation (including making an arrest) until the state’s attorney’s office has finished the 
review process and has either accepted or rejected the case for charges. Human Rights 
Watch spoke with a police official in Illinois who noted, “If the state’s attorney is going to 
reject the case, we don’t want to put a lot of work into it until we know for sure the case is 
going to move forward with them. I often wait to proceed too far in a case until I know what 
the state’s attorney is going to do with it.”29 This can have an adverse effect on ensuring 
arrests and prosecutions for any case awaiting felony review, including rape cases. As one 
rape victim advocate told Human Rights Watch,  
 
When police place a sexual assault investigation on hold until they get word 
of the felony review outcome … the state’s attorneys are getting cases 
presented to them without much investigative information, which in turn may 
make it more likely that the state’s attorney will reject the case because of 
weak evidence. And once a state’s attorney rejects a case, the police are 
going to close the case because they know it is not going to go anywhere.30 
 
The process of felony review may have a dampening effect on arrest rates. There is no 
comprehensive, publicly available state data on the charging, prosecution, and conviction 
rate for the crime of felony sexual assault. However, from interviews, Human Rights Watch 
heard anecdotal evidence of the difficulty of getting charges of felony sexual assault 
approved by the prosecutor’s office.  
 
                                                          
28 Human Rights Watch was unable to find any data on how many jurisdictions use the felony review process, although a 
significant number of jurisdictions we spoke with seemed to employ some form of the process.  
29 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with police official, Illinois, June 17, 2009.  
30 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with rape victim advocate, Chicago, Il, July 2, 2009.  
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Rape advocates’ frustration with the felony review process in Illinois was summed up in a 
letter from 10 sexual assault groups in Illinois to the Cook County (Chicago) State’s 
Attorney’s Office. They note that in Illinois, while case law holds that “credible victim 
testimony” is sufficient to support a felony sexual assault conviction and that “corroborating 
evidence” is not necessary, state’s attorneys seem to require additional evidence from rape 
cases in order to authorize charges.31 The letter states: 
  
We believe that the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office is generally not  
authorizing felony charges for sexual assault reported by victims of non-
strangers unless there is “corroborative evidence” such as bodily injury, a 
third-party witness, or an offender confession … This practice protects most 
rapists from the threat of criminal prosecution, devastates most victims who 
seek criminal justice assistance, and leads to the continued silence of most 
victims of sexual assault.32  
 
These advocates included a list of 22 women raped in Cook county whose cases were not 
approved for felony charges by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office despite the 
presence of “credible victim testimony.” 
 
The state’s attorney’s review process seems to influence what happens to a victim’s rape kit. 
Human Rights Watch heard from seven rape victims who were told by police that they were 
not going to submit the rape kit in their cases for testing until the state’s attorney’s office in 
their case had authorized felony charges.33 The Illinois State Police crime lab revealed that 
they sometimes returned untested rape kit evidence sent to them for testing once they were 
told (either by the state’s attorney’s office directly, or from the police department that sent 
the kit for testing) that the case had been rejected by the state’s attorney’s office for felony 
charges.34  
 
In some cases, police departments were unaware that the rape kits they sent to the crime 
lab had been returned untested because of a failure by the state’s attorney’s office to 
authorize charges. For example, the Chicago Police Department, which told Human Rights 
Watch that it sends every booked rape kit to crime lab for testing, recently discovered that 
                                                          
31 People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 02, 582 N.E.2d 690, 696-97 (1991). 
32 Letter from Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation to Anita Alvarez, Cook county state’s attorney, November 19, 2009, 
on file with Human Rights Watch.  
33 Human Rights Watch interview with rape survivors in a group session, Chicago, IL, November 12, 2009. 
34 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Jan Girten, Illinois State Police, Chicago, IL, January 13, 2009.  
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some were being returned untested.35 In February 2010, at the request of Human Rights 
Watch, the Chicago Police Department conducted a storage facility audit of rape kits 
collected between 2007 and 2009, and found that 88 rape kits sent to the crime lab were 
returned untested; an unspecified number of those were returned because the state’s 
attorney had closed the case.36  
 
National studies have shown that cases in which a rape kit was collected and contained DNA 
evidence of an offender were significantly more likely to move forward in the criminal justice 
system than cases in which there was no rape kit collected, or in which none was tested.37 
Studies have also found that the existence of forensic or physical evidence, such as the type 
of evidence stored in a rape kit, is an important predictor of prosecutors’ decisions to bring 
charges in a case.38 There is also emerging evidence that juries have come to expect DNA 
evidence in order to convict a defendant.39 These findings point to the importance of rape kit 
collection—and testing—for prosecuting cases of sexual assault.40  
 
Data on Illinois’s Rape Kit Backlog 
During the course of its research into the rape kit backlog in Illinois, Human Rights Watch 
encountered numerous obstacles which made it difficult to get an accurate account of the 
status of rape kits collected in the state, obstacles that also affect treatment of sexual 
assault in the state’s criminal justice system for tracking rape kits by police and sheriff’s 
departments once booked into their evidence storage facilities lack uniformity across 
jurisdictions. While the 2010 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act will enhance how rape 
kits are tracked in the state,41 at the time of this report’s printing, there are no state 
guidelines regarding how jurisdictions should track rape kits, record the status of rape kits, 
or format chain of custody and incident reports. Until Human Rights Watch requested the 
                                                          
35 Human Rights Watch interview with Tom Byrne, chief of detectives, Chicago Police Department, Chicago, IL, December 10, 
2009. 
36 Ibid.  
37 See for example, Dawn Beichner and Cassia Spohn, “Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining 
the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution Unit,” Criminal Justice Policy Review, vol. 16, no. 4, 2005, pp. 61-98 
38 Ibid.; Cassia Spohn and David Holleran, “Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A comparison of charging decisions in sexual assault 
cases involving strangers, acquaintances, and intimate partners,” Justice Quarterly, vol. 18, 2004, pp. 651-688; Kristen M. 
Williams, “Few convictions in rape case: Empirical evidence concerning some alternative explanations,” Journal of Criminal 
Justice, vol. 9, 1981, pp. 29-39.  
39 Richard Willing, “CSI Effect Has Juries Wanting More Evidence,” USA Today, August 5, 2004, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-08-05-csi-effect_x.htm (accessed May 18, 2010), p. 1A.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Illinois General Assembly, 96th General Assembly, Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act of 2010, SB3269, introduced 
February 9, 2010, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/96/SB/PDF/09600SB3269lv.pdf (accessed June 22, 2010). 
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rape kit data, many police departments had never counted their untested rape kits or set up 
a system to track such kits.  
 
In total, from rape kit information provided by 127 agencies to Human Rights Watch, at least 
7,494 rape kits were entered into law enforcement evidence in Illinois in recent years falling 
within the requested dates of 1995 to 2009. Law enforcement agencies reported that 3,568 
(47.6 percent) of these kits were sent to crime labs, and knew that only 1,474 (19.7 percent) 
of the kits were tested. Police and sheriff’s departments also reported that a total of 4,173 
kits were presently stored in local facilities, 38 rape kits were stored with the Illinois State 
Police, and 1,890 kits were known to be destroyed. 
 
Human Rights Watch found that in Illinois, most (69 percent) reported rapes do not result in 
the administration of a rape kit. Police and sheriff’s departments could only confirm that 6 
percent of reported rapes resulted in the testing of a kit by a crime lab. Departments 
confirmed that more kits were known to be untested than tested. Less than 20 percent of 
rape kits entered into law enforcement evidence could be confirmed as tested, compared 
with over 25 percent that were confirmed as destroyed.  
 
Human Rights Watch is deeply troubled by the difficulty encountered gaining access to rape 
kit data in Illinois, and believes it indicates systemic failure to prioritize and process rape 
kits in the state. Many law enforcement entities do not have electronic data tracking systems, 
meaning they had to go through their paper files to try to determine the number of rape kits 
booked into their storage facilities and the testing status of the kit. Our requests for these 
simple records were often rejected because of the burdensome nature of the paper search. 
Other jurisdictions simply resorted to photocopying their incident and chain of custody 
reports, which presented information in many different formulas and formats. Follow-up 
phone calls would sometimes clarify the information we sought, but not always. For some 
jurisdictions, we were unable to establish information on rape kits because of a lack of 
clarity in the records provided to us. The response from a public records official from Park 
Ridge Police Department to our question about what certain records meant is typical: “We 
simply don’t know. Your guess is as good as mine.”42  
 
The manner in which different law enforcement agencies responded to the identical public 
records request highlights the chaotic nature of law enforcement data management in 
Illinois, and the need for the data tracking requirements contained in the 2010 Sexual 
                                                          
42 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a public records officer, Park Ridge Police Department, Park Ridge, IL, 
September 18, 2009. 
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Assault Evidence Submission Act and other standardized data management protocols. The 
majority of agencies provided their data electronically; however, at least 35 agencies mailed 
Human Rights Watch boxes or envelopes of paper documents, and several agencies mailed 
us nearly 1,000 separate documents. While 51 percent of agencies who provided us with 
information did so in a single document containing data, the other 49 percent sent multiple 
types of documents requiring Human Rights Watch to piece together whether reported rapes 
resulted in rape kits being taken and whether rape arrests occurred.43 Several agencies 
simply submitted police narrative reports of all reported rape cases, which required Human 
Rights Watch to determine through reading the narratives whether rape kits were taken in 
each case.  
 
There were also instances of agencies providing, or failing to properly redact, sensitive 
identifying information in their public records responses. More than 25 agencies supplied 
victims’ names and 22 agencies also gave suspects’ names. In total, more than 1,000 
victims’ names—nearly 100 of them child victims—were handed over to Human Rights Watch 
from public records requests. Victim and suspect addresses, telephone numbers, and social 
security numbers were also given by a number of law enforcement agencies. Several 
agencies submitted the private information of juvenile victims. In an egregious error, DNA 
test results were also mailed to Human Rights Watch in response to the public records 
request, which did not—and could not legally—have sought such information. These errors 
in public record data management occurred despite the fact that the Illinois Office of the 
Attorney General offers comprehensive data training to law enforcement offices in Illinois. It 
is troubling that, despite receiving adequate public records training, law enforcement 
departments continue to make these serious mistakes.  
 
Illinois is not alone in its struggle to maintain rape kit data. According to a 2009 report 
prepared for the National Institute of Justice, researchers surveyed over 2,500 police 
departments across the country and found that “larger police agencies reported significant 
difficulty answering questions about unsolved rape and property cases because this 
information was not maintained in a centralized system.”44 In fact, 60 percent of law 
                                                          
43 Sixty-eight departments provided a single aggregated report containing some or all of the requested data. Other agencies 
sent a variety of reports for each reported rape case: 47 departments sent chain of custody reports, 33 sent incident or offense 
reports, 11 sent lab evidence receipts, 30 sent evidence logs, and others submitted data via phone calls or other methods. 
44 Kevin J. Strom et al., “The 2007 Survey of Law Enforcement Forensic Evidence Processing,” no. 228415, prepared for 
Katherine Browning, National Institute of Justice, October 2009, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228415.pdf 
(accessed May 13, 2010), pp. 4-5. 
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enforcement agencies who responded to the national survey did not have computerized 
tracking systems for their evidence.45 
 
Determining what Illinois does with the rape kits collected by the police is important to 
addressing sexual violence in Illinois, and providing justice to the thousands of victims who 
report their rape to the police every year.  
 
One Case Raises Questions on Rape Kit Record-Keeping in Chicago 
On April 20, 2007, after a night out dancing in Chicago, Stephanie H. (pseudonym) returned to a 
friend’s house with her friend’s boyfriend. After her friend went to sleep, the boyfriend came into 
the living room where Stephanie was sleeping, pushed her to the ground and raped her.46 Within 
48 hours of her assault, Stephanie went to the hospital where a rape kit was administered.47 
According to Stephanie’s medical records, which Stephanie shared with Human Rights Watch, a 
rape kit was taken and the nurse’s examination found evidence of forced penetration,48 in direct 
opposition to the perpetrator’s claims that “nothing happened that night.”49  
 
For two years Stephanie repeatedly called the Chicago Police Department—at times as frequently as 
every week—to inquire about her case: “I was going through panic attacks in the middle of the day. 
I couldn’t breathe. Even in New York I was terrified I would run into him…. I couldn’t sleep or eat. 
Why is it that I had to work so hard and still nothing got done...? For two years I forgot what it was 
like to be happy.”50 
 
“I thought that if I kept on calling and hounding, they would get things done faster…. I was polite 
and well-spoken. I begged. I got a second detective to talk [to me about the case] … and relived the 
experience all over again.”51 But eventually, Stephanie was informed that no charges would be 
brought against her rapist. 
 
The Chicago Police Department’s report of Stephanie’s case tells a very different story, and 
illustrates a fundamental problem with their record keeping.  
 
When Human Rights Watch first inquired on Stephanie’s behalf for her police report, we were told 
that we could only receive a redacted copy of her report because, “this case is still open.”52 When 
                                                          
45 Ibid.  
46 Human Rights Watch interview with Stephanie H. (pseudonym), New York, NY, January 12, 2010. 
47 Stephanie H. rape kit examination and hospital records, on file with Human Rights Watch.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Human Rights Watch interview with Stephanie H., January 12, 2010. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Letter from Michael Kelly, assistant freedom of information officer, Chicago Police Department, to Human Rights Watch, 
October 1, 2009, on file with Human Rights Watch. 
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we asked why the case was open even though Stephanie was informed of the contrary, the officer 
responded, “I don’t have the authority to answer…. They could be waiting on more evidence.”53 
 
When Human Rights Watch received the police report, its contents were inconsistent with 
Stephanie’s hospital records. In the police report the responding officer on the case concluded, 
“Vict[im] went to [redacted] hospital for medical evaluation. Per Dr. [redacted], vict[im] in good 
condition. Will be treated and released. No rape kit will be administered.”54 
 
We asked a representative from the Chicago Police Department to clarify, and were informed that 
the existence of rape kits are included in the initial police report, and in Stephanie’s case, “it looks 
like there was no rape kit.”55 When we inquired why a hospital report indicated a rape kit while the 
police report did not, the department told us they did not know.56 
 
When Stephanie learned that the police report indicated that no rape kit was taken, she told us, “I 
am astounded. I thought that my experience with the police could not get more demoralizing. To 
learn that they don’t even have a record of my rape kit, when I can’t stop thinking about the 
experience of having the kit taken, adds on to my disbelief about this whole process.”57 
 
As of this writing, despite more than nine requests to the Chicago Police Department for records on 
their rape kit data, Stephanie’s case report is the only complete response to our public records 
request for rape kit information that we have received. In an interview with the Chicago Police 
Department, representatives told Human Rights Watch that it is official Chicago Police Department 
policy to send every rape kit to the crime lab for testing.58 While we do not know if other survivors—
like Stephanie—handed over their rape kits to the Chicago Police only to wait for years without 
justice, we do know that the effect of the experience on Stephanie has been profound:  
  
After this experience, I don’t feel safe anymore. I used to think that if something 
happened to me, the law would protect me. I don’t think it will anymore. I am a 
tough girl, but it made me feel like if something happened, the law isn’t there for 
me. It doesn’t really work.59  
 
                                                          
53 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Rory O’Brian, assistant freedom of information officer, Chicago Police 
Department, Chicago, IL, October 16, 2009. 
54 General Offense Police Report for Stephanie H., Chicago Police Department, April 22, 2007, on file with Human Rights 
Watch. Bold added. 
55 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Rory O’Brian, October 16, 2009. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Human Rights Watch interview with Stephanie H., January 12, 2010. 
58 Human Rights Watch interview with Chief of Detectives Tom Byrne, January 21, 2010. 
59 Ibid. 
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IV. Rape Kit Evidence Collection in Illinois 
 
Special care is required in the collection of rape kit evidence.60 Sexual Assault Nurse 
Examiners (SANEs) are nurses who receive special training in how to provide appropriate 
medical, forensic, and emotional care to rape victims, and can provide 24-hour, first-
response care to sexual assault patients in a medical setting.61 In contrast, emergency room 
physicians and nurses often have little or no training on the medical treatment of rape 
victims, or on how to conduct a forensic rape kit exam.62 The importance of SANEs is 
reflected in the creation of a SANEs’ training program out of the Illinois Office of the Attorney 
General, which has classroom-trained more than 530 nurses through its free training 
program.63  
 
While no system exists to track SANE resources in Illinois, experts Human Rights Watch 
spoke with during the course of our research agree that, despite a robust training program, 
there is still a shortage of SANEs in the state, in part because of hospitals’ unwillingness to 
support the hiring and training of such nurses full-time. Shannon Liew, SANE Coordinator for 
the state of Illinois, estimates that of the over 530 nurses participating in the attorney 
general’s SANE training in the past five years, only approximately 100 nurses have become 
                                                          
60 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Jennifer Pierce-Week, president, International Association of Forensic Nurses, 
Arnold, MD, March 23, 2008. For more information on the collection of rape kits, see for example, The Sexual Assault Nurse 
Examiner-Sexual Assault Response Team web-site at http://www.sane-sart.com (accessed January 20, 2009). Human Rights 
Watch observed the simulated rape kit collection process in Illinois during a visit to the Cook County Child Advocacy Center on 
January 11, 2009. A model process would look like this: After intake and counseling, which includes assessing and treating 
any critical care needs, the patient is interviewed to obtain a history of the assault. Then, a nurse practitioner conducts the 
medical and forensic examination. The victim undresses while standing over a large sheet of paper, and anything that falls 
from the clothing or body that may provide links to a perpetrator or a crime scene (for example, hairs, debris, and carpet or 
clothing fibers) is collected and placed in the rape kit. A sexual assault nurse examines the victim on a gynecological table 
with stirrups. The nurse scans the body with an ultraviolet light to find what may be otherwise undetectable semen or saliva 
that might contain the assailant’s DNA. The nurse then swabs every part of the victim’s body that the ultraviolet light 
fluoresces. The victim is examined from “head to toe” to identify any physical injuries sustained during the assault, which can 
include scratches, bruises, bite marks, ligature marks, and burst blood vessels caused by strangulation. Every visible physical 
injury is photographed. A magnifying digital camera called a colposcope—which is noninvasive and can photograph inside 
body cavities without requiring insertion—is placed near the anal, vaginal, and oral cavities to record any lacerations or other 
injuries inside those areas. The nurse then collects other samples, such as fingernail scrapings, pubic hair combings, and 
urine and blood, placing each in separate envelopes and or tubes. The swabs are labeled and sealed in containers with 
evidence tape. All of the evidence is then placed in a large white envelope—the rape kit. 
61 WK Taylor, “Collecting evidence for sexual assault: The role of the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE),” International 
Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics, vol. 78 , September 2002, pp. S91-S94.  
62 Annette Amey and David Bishai, “Measuring the quality of medical care for women who experience sexual assault with data 
from the National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey,” Annals of Emergency Medicine, vol. 39, June 2002, 
https://secure.muhealth.org/~ed/students/articles/AnnEM_39_p0631.pdf (accessed May 13, 2010), pp. 631-638; WK Taylor, 
“Collecting evidence for sexual assault: The role of the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE),” International Journal of 
Gynecology and Obstetrics, vol. 78 , September 2002, pp. S91-S94.  
63 Illinois Attorney General, Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner webpage, 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/victims/sane.html (accessed June 24, 2010).  
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fully SANE certified (that is, have received both classroom and clinical training), and of these, 
not all are necessarily practicing and most are not full-time SANEs.64 National experts 
estimate that to adequately meet the needs of a community, there should be an average of 
15 full-time SANEs per 1 million people, although many jurisdictions around the country do 
not meet this recommendation.65 This means Illinois, with a population of nearly 13 million, 
would require 195 full-time SANEs, or about twice the estimated number fully trained and 
certified in the past six years.66 However, the 15 nurses to 1 million residents recommended 
ratio assumes that nurses are accessible to victims; considering the large rural population in 
Illinois, the required number of SANEs is probably higher. A significant obstacle for nurses 
who wish to obtain SANE certification in Illinois is that they are not reimbursed for the cost of 
clinical training nor paid for their time away from work.67 Numerous sexual assault experts 
and nurse examiners told Human Rights Watch that the lack of hospitals support for sexual 
assault nurse examiners is the primary cause of the shortage of SANEs in the state.  
 
SANE programs were established, in part, to address the logistical and emotional difficulties 
victims face when reporting their rape to a hospital emergency room.68 The lack of SANEs can 
have a negative impact on a victim’s experience at the hospital. An Illinois rape victim told 
Human Rights Watch of arriving at a hospital in the hours after her rape. The emergency 
room doctor came into the room and began questioning the rape victim about the details of 
her rape. When she told him the rape occurred while on a date, the doctor questioned 
whether there was any need for him to collect a rape kit: “I don’t want to waste my time if 
people can’t agree whether or a not a rape even occurred here.”69  
 
Untrained ER personnel’s inexperience with collecting a rape kit can be just as traumatizing 
to rape victims as their judgmental attitudes. A rape victim advocate told Human Right 
Watch about emergency room doctors who have never seen a rape kit before, nor 
                                                          
64 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Shannon Liew, RN-BSN, SANE coordinator, Office of the Illinois Attorney 
General, Chicago, Il, January 6, 2010.  
65 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Joanne Archambault, president and training director, SATI, inc., Addy, WA, 
November 7, 2009.  
66 US Census Bureau, “State and County Quick Facts: Illinois,” http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17000.html 
(accessed February 16, 2010).  
67 Ibid.  
68 Linda Ledray, “Counseling victims of rape: Their needs and a new treatment approach,” in HJ Scheider, ed., The victim in 
international perspective (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982); Diane DiNitto et al., “After rape: Who should examine rape 
survivors?” American Journal of Nursing, vol. 86, no. 5, May 1986, pp. 538-540; Linda E. Ledray, “SANE Development and 
Operation Guide, Office for Victims of Crime,” Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 1999. 
69 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with rape victim, northern Illinois, August 21, 2009.  
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administered one.70 One doctor read out loud the instructions on the rape kit package as he 
performed each step.71 National research has shown that rape victims who are treated by 
emergency room doctors and nurses are more likely to characterize their experience as 
“upsetting” and “distressing,” and report feeling “re-victimized” during the rape kit 
examination.72 
 
The shortage of sexual assault nurse examiners can have an impact on the successful 
collection and testing of rape kit evidence. In Illinois, crime lab personnel, prosecutors, and 
police told Human Rights Watch of instances in which the way the rape kit evidence was 
collected negatively impacted progress of the case. A prosecutor told Human Rights Watch 
of a case where an emergency room doctor failed to collect DNA swabs from every place 
where the victim indicated the perpetrator had ejaculated, and instead only swabbed her 
vaginal area. The prosecutor told us,  
 
The victim claimed that the suspect had ejaculated in her belly button. The 
suspect … denied ejaculating in the victim’s belly button. I had hoped to test 
a swab taken from the victim’s belly button in order to back up the victim’s 
version of events and discredit the suspect at trial.… [T]he lab informed me 
that the doctor had not swabbed the victim’s belly button … it was incredibly 
frustrating to move forward without crucial evidence.73  
 
In a letter to Human Rights Watch, the DNA criminalists in charge of sex crimes at the 
DuPage County Crime Laboratory noted,  
 
All of our policies [on sexual assault kit testing] assure that sexual assault 
evidence submitted to [the lab] will be analyzed with the utmost of care. 
What cannot be assured, however, is that all sexual assault evidence will be 
collected in the best manner possible, or even that it will be collected at all.… 
Many hospitals in DuPage County are not adequately staffed with SANEs. 
Some hospitals have SANEs but not on all shifts.… If the emergency room 
personnel are not adequately trained to recover and preserve this evidence, 
                                                          
70 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with rape victim, Springfield, IL, October 9, 2009.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Rebecca Campbell et al., “Preventing the ‘Second Rape’: Rape Survivors’ Experiences with Community Service Providers,” 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence, vol. 16, no. 12, 2001, pp. 1239-1259.  
73 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with prosecutor, central Illinois, October 22, 2009.  
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analysis of that evidence and later arrest and prosecution of a sexual 
predator may be compromised.74  
 
A shortage of SANEs in Illinois may be one reason why only 31 percent of reported rapes lead 
to the collection of a rape kit in Illinois. National studies have shown that the availability of 
SANEs impacts the criminal justice process. For example, a 2009 National Institute of Justice 
study found that rape cases in which a sexual assault nurse examiner collected the evidence 
had a greater chance of leading to successful prosecution.75 
 
Once a rape kit is collected from a victim who reports the crime to the police, the rape kit will 
be taken into police custody (booked into police evidence) for storage before testing. Many 
rape victims assume their rape kit will be tested, but Human Rights Watch research in Illinois 
indicates thousands of rape kits in police storage were never sent to the crime lab for testing.  
                                                          
74 Letter to Human Rights Watch from Tamara A. Camp, forensic scientist, DuPage County Criminal Laboratory, June 30, 2009.  
75 Rebecca Campbell et al., “Systems Change Analysis of SANE Programs: Identifying the Mediating Mechanisms of Criminal 
Justice System Impact,” no. 226497, prepared for the United States Department of Justice, January 2009,  
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226497.pdf (accessed February 16, 2010).  
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V. Untested Rape Kits in Illinois Police Storage Facilities 
 
I would guess that the vast majority of kits I have collected have never been 
sent for testing. Or, at least, the results were never used, because if they 
were, I would have been called upon to testify about how I collected the kit. 
In my 10 years doing this work, I have collected at least 500 kits and only 
heard back from the police about one of the rape kits.  
—sexual assault nurse examiner in Illinois76  
 
The day after my rape kit was collected I went to the police for my interview. 
The police officer spent the whole interview asking me about my character, 
my actions that night. He didn’t seem interested in hearing about my rapist’s 
behavior. At the end of the interview, he told me he didn’t think I had a very 
strong case. I called for months afterwards to see if they were going to test 
the rape kit, but I never heard back. 
—rape survivor in Illinois77 
 
We want every one of our rape kits tested. Every kit is evidence, and has so 
much potential to help a case—potential that you don’t even realize until you 
get the test results back.  
—Tom Byrne, chief of detectives, Chicago Police78 
 
As of May 2010 there were at least 3,926 rape kits in Illinois storage facilities that law 
enforcement confirmed were not tested, based on public records data sent to Human Rights 
Watch from 148 agencies. This number may be higher, as it only represents those rape kits 
where law enforcement could confirm their status. There are an additional 2,094 kits in 
storage that law enforcement could not confirm whether they were tested or untested. The 
vast majority of these untested rape kits were never requested for testing. But in some 
instances, the rape kits in police storage were sent for testing, but returned from the crime 
lab untested because the case was closed by the state’s attorney’s office.  
 
                                                          
76 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with sexual assault nurse examiner, Peoria, IL, August 11, 2009.  
77 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with rape survivor, Aurora, IL, April 2, 2010. 
78 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Chief of Detectives Tom Byrne, January 15, 2010.  
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Most individual police department policies that Human Rights Watch reviewed in the course 
of its research for this report still allowed detective or department discretion in deciding 
which rape kits to send to the crime lab, a practice which will be remedied by the 2010 
Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act’s requirement that all rape kits collected by police 
be sent to the crime lab for testing within 10 days of collection.79  
 
Law enforcement gave Human Rights Watch various reasons for not sending rape kits to the 
lab for testing. By far the most common reason was the belief that testing was not necessary 
in an “acquaintance rape”—when the identity of the alleged perpetrator was known to the 
victim no matter the history, or lack thereof, in their relationship. Law enforcement held this 
view despite the possibility that the collected evidence could connect a suspect to multiple 
rape kits and establish a serial rapist, discredit the suspect’s version of events and affirm 
the victim’s version of events, or exonerate innocent suspects. As one police official told 
Human Rights Watch, “We don’t need the DNA test when we know who the suspect is 
already without it. It would be a waste of everyone’s time and money.”80  
  
Police also told Human Rights Watch they would not submit a rape kit unless they thought 
they had a “winnable” case on their hands. For example, one police official told Human 
Rights Watch in explaining why his department did not send every rape kit for testing, “I 
don’t know if you know about our community but we are a university community—98 percent 
to 99 percent of criminal assaults involve acquaintances and end up without prosecution. 
That may be where the issue is—a consent issue. A lot of our sexual assault reports [involve 
sexual assaults that] start out as consensual sex but then turn non-consensual.”81  
 
Other officers have pointed out to Human Rights Watch that victim credibility is often the key 
issue in deciding how to move a case forward, including whether to submit the rape kit for 
testing. As one officer told Human Rights Watch “In my experience, many rape victims are 
lying. They come forward to hide from their parents that they had sex with their boyfriend, or 
they want attention. In other cases, the victim’s story doesn’t make sense, or maybe it does 
but there is no way a jury is going to believe her over the suspect.”82 
 
Backlogs at the state crime laboratory may also influence officers not to send in rape kits. 
Some officers told Human Rights Watch that they don’t submit the rape kit for testing 
                                                          
79 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act of 2010, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/96/SB/PDF/09600SB3269lv.pdf, sec. 10. 
80 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with police official, Galesburg, IL, November 4, 2009.  
81 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with police officer, southern Illinois, January 26, 2010.  
82 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with police officer, central Illinois, January 25, 2010.  
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because they know it could be months, if not years, before it gets tested. An investigative 
detective told Human Rights Watch, “If the evidence is absolutely crucial to making the case, 
I will beg the crime lab to test the kit, and put it closer to the top of the pile. But if I am not 
sure the rape kit test will add anything to the case, I will save up my favors with the crime lab 
for another case.”83 
 
Not sending a rape kit to the crime lab for testing can have a significant impact on a victim’s 
experience with the criminal justice system. One victim told Human Rights Watch, “I feel so 
stupid for going to the police. What made me think they would take my case seriously? I 
would feel better if I had just kept my rape to myself.”84 Even if law enforcement decides not 
to test a rape kit, communicating that decision to the victim in a timely and informative way 
may ease the victim’s experience. As one rape victim told Human Rights Watch, “They may 
have had a reason not to test my kit, but I wouldn’t know because I didn’t get any 
information about my case, much less information about why certain investigative decisions 
were made. Just knowing the reasoning behind the police’s decision not to move my case 
forward may have helped me a little.”85 
 
Even in instances where the police do move an investigation forward, not sending the rape 
kit for testing to the crime lab in a timely way can have negative consequences for the victim. 
Human Rights Watch spoke with a family member of a 7-year-old child who was repeatedly 
raped by her stepfather over a period of two years.86 When she reported what was happening 
to her mother, she took the girl to the hospital and the nurse noted the presence of semen. If 
the police had tested the rape kit and found the stepfather’s semen, the state could 
immediately move forward with rape charges, as there is no defense for statutory rape. 
Although the police were moving the investigation forward, and charges were eventually 
filed against the stepfather, the rape kit sat untested in police storage for more than a year. 
During that time, the victim’s family had gone to family court to obtain an order of protection 
against the stepfather. In the absence of the rape kit evidence as proof of the stepfather’s 
crime, the victim had to testify at the hearing, “which was a very difficult experience for her,” 
a family member told Human Rights Watch.87 The daughter also seemed to feel that the rape 
kit evidence was important. “Although we believed her story, I think she was looking for 
some outside evidence that what she was saying was true. The stepfather was denying 
                                                          
83 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with police detective, Joliet, IL, October 12, 2009.  
84 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with rape victim, Evanston, IL, November 6, 2009.  
85 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with rape victim, Chicago, IL, April 4, 2010. 
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87 Ibid.  
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anything had happened, and the daughter seemed to grow increasingly anxious to have 
proof in her case that what she knew happened had really happened.”88 After a year, the 
police finally sent the rape kit to the lab for testing, and the test results showed that the 
stepfather had raped the child.  
 
The large number of untested rape kits in Illinois storage facilities, and the lack of 
knowledge on the part of most law enforcement agencies of their true number, make it 
especially important that Illinois’s response to its rape kit backlog is part of a 
comprehensive, specific, state-wide plan that is made known to the public and subject to 
significant monitoring and oversight. The 2010 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act, if 
effectively enforced, will provide such a plan and result in each of these untested rape kits, 
as well as every future rape kit booked into police evidence, being sent to Illinois state crime 
lab system (or other designated laboratory) for testing.89 But as Human Rights Watch’s 
research demonstrates, the crime lab already has its own backlog. The arrival of backlogged 
kits from police departments will exacerbate the problem. The crime lab simply does not 
currently have the capacity or resources to test every booked rape kit in Illinois in a timely 
manner.  
                                                          
88 Ibid.  
89 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act of 2010, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/96/SB/PDF/09600SB3269lv.pdf. 
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VI. Untested Rape Kits in Illinois Crime Labs 
 
In my experience, I have seen the fact of delays at the crime lab deter police 
even more from sending in a rape kit for testing. They want the case resolved, 
and if they know the rape kit evidence won’t come back for a year, they 
would rather not wait to close a case for that long. I have also seen police 
use the fact of delays as an excuse to my clients who want their rape kit 
tested. They tell them: “Even if we send in the kit, you won’t get a result back 
for a year, so why not just try putting the rape behind you instead?” 
—Rape treatment provider, southwest Illinois90  
 
Once a police officer has requested that a rape case be sent for testing, it will be sent to one 
of the eight Forensic Biology/DNA casework laboratories operated by the Illinois State Police 
and placed in a queue for testing.91  
 
 While the vast majority of untested rape kits in Illinois currently reside in police storage 
facilities, a second backlog exists in police crime lab facilities where rape kits are submitted 
for DNA analysis, but wait, often for a very long time, to be tested. These delays have 
significant impacts on the criminal case, and delay justice for rape victims. As one law 
enforcement official put it, “I have seen rape cases delayed by over a year while we waited 
for a test result. This means we lose momentum in the case—witnesses move and can’t be 
tracked down, the trial start date has to be continually pushed back, and sometimes 
witnesses grow weary of the toll the case is taking on them and start to wonder if they want 
to be part of it anymore.”92  
 
Rape kit testing delays appear to be caused primarily by a lack of capacity at the state crime 
labs to handle each DNA request they receive, and secondarily by the state’s ineffectiveness 
in addressing the needs of the laboratory system. The 2009 Management and Program Audit 
of the Illinois State Police’s Division of Forensic Services (“Auditor General Report”), found 
that the number of total backlogged cases (including all types of cases and forensic 
analyses) at the state’s crime labs increased more than 200 percent from 2002 to 2007, 
                                                          
90 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with rape victim advocate, southwestern Illinois, May 12, 2009. 
91 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with principals at the Illinois State Police, Springfield, IL, June, 19, 2009.  
92 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with law enforcement official, Naperville, IL, January 11, 2010. 
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from 3,426 to 10,387 cases.93 During that same time period, the number of forensic 
scientists at the lab actually declined by 3 percent.94  
 
Illinois is not alone in its struggle with crime lab backlogs. Crime labs across the country are 
inundated with DNA testing requests. The most recent federal census of publicly funded 
crime laboratories—released in 2008 using data collected in 2005—shows that during 2005, 
public crime labs saw their DNA backlog double from the beginning to the end of the year, 
and that public crime labs across the country would need to increase their DNA staff by 73 
percent to keep up with DNA testing needs and requests.95 
 
While crime labs in Illinois have backlogs in nearly every kind of criminal case, the backlog 
of evidence in rape cases is particularly pronounced with data showing that the crime lab 
cannot keep up with current rape kit testing demand, much less the increase in demand that 
will be caused by the 2010 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act. Once the Illinois State 
Police submit their rape kit reduction plan as required by the 2010 law,96 it is imperative that 
legislators approve the funding necessary to address the lab’s increased capacity needs.  
 
According to data the Illinois State Police provided to Human Rights Watch, as of February 
2009 there were approximately 622 Forensic Biology cases (that is, all offenses including 
sexual assault) waiting for testing in the state crime labs.97 In each year from 2001 through 
2008, the ISP crime labs received anywhere from 2800 to 4400 rape cases, or an average of 
230 to 360 rape cases per month.98 According to the ISP, they have the capacity to analyze 
about 277 cases per month, which means every month up to 83 cases may be added to the 
testing backlog.99 This struggle to keep up with testing is occurring even though the Illinois 
State Police crime labs may not be receiving the vast majority of kits in law enforcement 
custody.  
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The good news is that the Illinois State Police have made progress in reducing the overall 
backlog of cases at their crime laboratories. As of April 30, 2010, the ISP laboratory system 
reported a total statewide case backlog of 6,197 cases, down significantly from the 10,387 
cases cited in the 2009 Illinois Auditor General Report. These backlogs include all types of 
cases, not just sexual assault cases. The average age of DNA cases worked in April 2010 was 
71.2 days. These backlogs are being reduced despite increased case submissions of 5,800 
Forensic Biology cases and 4,900 total DNA cases per year. The elimination of the backlog 
has happened in part because of increased staffing at the labs, increased use of overtime for 
employees, and the implementation of efficiency measures.100 
 
Nonetheless, as far as Human Rights Watch can tell, the state does not track the average 
amount of time it takes for a rape kit to be tested, from the moment a kit is sent to the lab to 
when the law enforcement receive the test results. Law enforcement officials often describe 
waiting a year for test results, and some reported delays of up to two years.  
 
These delays can take a toll on all stages of a criminal sexual assault case. In a survey of 
local police departments conducted in 2007, 46 percent thought that the Illinois State Police 
crime lab’s lack of timeliness “negatively impacted a case in the past five years.”101 In the 
worst instances, the results were so delayed that the case could not be pursued. For 
example, one law enforcement official recounted, “I have received lab reports in which a 
suspect DNA profile was identified after the statute of limitations passed. It does little good 
to identify a suspect after the period which prosecution might begin.”102 In other interviews 
conducted by Human Rights Watch, law enforcement praised the Illinois State Police crime 
laboratories. As one officer told us, “They do their best to meet the testing deadlines I 
request of them, and if they can’t, they do an excellent job of communicating the situation 
and helping me understand the reasons for any delays. But for the most part, there are not 
delays of the kind that jeopardize my investigations.”103 
 
Some law enforcement officials do not want to send—and some state’s attorneys do not 
want to assess—a sexual assault case for felony charges review until they have the crime lab 
results back. Law enforcement agencies are also reluctant to make an arrest or charging 
decision until the DNA results are back. This can delay movement in the case by months, 
                                                          
100 Human Rights Watch e-mail from Illinois State Police, June 8, 2010.  
101 Illinois Auditor General Report, http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-
Audits/09-ISP-Labs-Mgmt-Pgm-Full.pdf, p. viii. (bold in original). 
102 Ibid., p. 61. 
103 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with law enforcement officer, June 10, 2009.  
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and even years. As one sheriff noted in the Auditor General Report, “By the time almost any 
analysis has been completed and we received the report the criminal case has turned into a 
cold case. Our average [wait time for crime lab test] results from the past year is at 8 to 12 
months.”104 
 
Testing delays can impact the start of trial, and perhaps jeopardize legal proceedings. 
According to a state’s attorney, “We have already delayed the start of [a] trial four times, as 
we are waiting on the [rape] kit results from the lab. The judge has threatened to declare a 
mistrial if there is one more delay, and I am worried that the testing delay is going to derail 
our case.”105 
 
While the lack of crime lab capacity is a significant cause of rape kit testing delays, the ISP’s 
ability to manage its crime laboratories also contributes to the rape kit backlog. For example, 
the 2009 Illinois Auditor General Report found, among other things, that the ISP let $19.3 
million in state funds for forensic testing and $1.3 million in 21 federal grants lapse between 
fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2007; specifically, of $1.5 million in grants received 
through 2008 for the explicit purpose of testing sexual assault evidence, the Auditor General 
concluded that the ISP failed to use more than $246,000, while the Illinois State Police 
disagreed and stated that they only failed to use $48,800.106 The audit also found that the 
ISP transferred $6 million of those funds to other non-forensic related purposes. In the same 
time period, the number of backlogged cases at the ISP increased over 200 percent. 
Additionally, the Auditor General Report found that the “ISP has underreported backlogged 
DNA cases … providing inaccurate and misleading information.”107 
 
While the Auditor General Report suggests that the Illinois State Police has struggled to 
manage its crime labs effectively, principals with the ISP told Human Rights Watch the 
department disagreed with many of the points raised in the report. They have taken steps to 
improve tracking of grant money and have increased transparency regarding the nature and 
scope of their DNA backlogs.108 
 
                                                          
104 Illinois Auditor General Report, http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-
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Enhancing the ISP crime lab capacity for more timely and expansive rape kit testing will 
require more state and federal funding. The 2010 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act 
requires that the ISP submit a plan to document how it will eliminate the rape kit backlog 
and handle the influx of rape kits sent to them.109 Once the plan is submitted, the ISP should 
advocate for these resources, and the legislature should approve the funding necessary to 
eliminate the rape kit backlog and delays in testing new kits. Illinois is experiencing a 
significant financial crisis, but public safety policies that will help apprehend violent 
offenders and prevent future rapes are a necessary investment and a core government 
responsibility.  
 
Achieving this goal will require not just political will to appropriate the necessary funding, 
but oversight to ensure that all funds available are used effectively and efficiently toward the 
testing of rape kits. In order to make sure that all money appropriated to the ISP crime labs 
for rape kit testing is spent correctly, the legislature should require the ISP crime labs to 
submit a detailed plan for how they will eliminate their rape kit backlog and increase testing 
capabilities, and a legislative task force should exercise oversight over their progress.  
 
If the legislature does not provide the Illinois State Police with the resources necessary to 
test every booked rape kit, then the state must establish uniform, objective, statutory 
procedures by which rape kit testing should proceed in the state. The law should make clear 
that a rape case cannot be closed by the police or rejected by the state’s attorney unless any 
rape kit evidence connected to the case is tested. The procedures should allow law 
enforcement discretion not to test a rape kit if the case will proceed regardless of the kit test 
result. This would ensure that law enforcement take into account a certain amount of 
investigative information before making a final decision on a rape case.  
                                                          
109 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act of 2010, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/96/SB/PDF/09600SB3269lv.pdf. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
The number of untested rape kits in Illinois points to larger concerns with the way Illinois 
handles rape kits and rape investigations. For rape victims to access justice, policymakers 
and law enforcement officials in Illinois should ensure that all booked rape kits are sent for 
testing as required by the 2010 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act. But their 
responsibility does not end there. Law enforcement personnel, in collaboration with rape 
treatment providers and with the support of elected officials, need to create systems to 
ensure that every reported rape case is thoroughly investigated and all leads are followed so 
that it is possible to identify and arrest those responsible. As one rape treatment provider 
told Human Rights Watch, “It’s time to show rape victims that we value what they went 
through to have a rape kit collected. It’s an invasive process that we ask nearly every rape 
victim to have done in the immediate aftermath of perhaps the most traumatic event of their 
life. The least we can do is test it.”110 
 
The 2010 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act should ensure that every booked rape kit 
is sent to the Illinois State Police crime laboratory—or other designated laboratory—for 
testing. When it goes into effect, Illinois will be the first state in the country to attempt to 
comprehensively address its rape kit backlog. The new law provides Illinois with the 
possibility of eliminating its rape kit backlog entirely. To ensure justice for rape victims, 
Illinois must appropriate the funds and provide the stringent oversight necessary to realize 
its goal of testing all rape kits in a timely, effective manner.  
                                                          
110 Human Rights Watch interview with Sharmili Majmudar, rape treatment provider, Chicago, IL, May 5, 2009.  
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Illinois’s Failure to Test Rape Kits 
The DNA evidence in a sexual assault kit (“rape kit”), collected from a victim’s body after a rape, can provide
critical investigative information. Yet new data collected by Human Rights Watch suggests that in Illinois, years
after the crime, only one in five rape kits collected by police is tested. This gap represents lost justice for rape
victims
I Used to Think the Law Would Protect Me examines the reasons for the gap. In our year-long investigation, we
sought data from 264 state and local law enforcement agencies in Illinois. While not all responded, we received
rape kit data from 127 agencies on the status of 7,494 rape kits booked into police storage in Illinois over the past
15 years. Of that total, only 1,474, or 19.7 percent, were confirmed as tested.
In addition to untested rape kits in police storage facilities, we found an inadequate law enforcement response
to reported sexual assaults; a shortage of sexual assault nurse examiners to collect evidence for rape kits;
insufficient hospital treatment facilities for rape victims; and testing delays at the state crime laboratory. 
There is new reason to hope that this will soon change: a recent Illinois law, if signed by the governor, will begin
to correct the state’s abysmal record of response to rape. In 2010, when it passed the Sexual Assault Evidence
Submission Act, the Illinois legislature became the first in the country to require that every rape kit collected by
law enforcement be sent to the state crime lab for testing. Nevertheless, our research raises questions regarding
the crime lab’s capacity to handle the enormous influx of untested rape kits it will receive under the law’s
provisions. 
The United States is party to a number of treaties that acknowledge rape as a human rights abuse and require the
US to ensure the protection of individuals from sexual assault and rape and to prosecute the perpetrators. If
Illinois public officials wish to implement good public safety policy standards and human rights law they should
move decisively to provide the resources necessary to implement the 2010 Sexual Assault Evidence Submission
Act and test all rape kit evidence in Illinois.
